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Victor v. Nebraska:
DUE PROCESS
CLAUSE DOES
NOT REQUIRE
THAT JURY
INSTRUCTIONS
EMPLOY ANY
PARTICULAR
FORMULATION OF
''REASONABLE
DOUBT,"
BUT MERELY
REQUIRE S THAT
THE CONCEPT BE
ACCURATELY
CONVEYED.

In Victor v. Nebraska,
114 S. Ct. 1239 (1994), the
United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed its reluctance to supervise the use of state model
jury instructions to define the
"reasonable doubt" standard to
juries in criminal trials. In so
doing, the Court sent a clear
message that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require
states to perfectly define the
gray area at which "reasonable
doubt" resides.
On October 14, 1984,
AUrredPurthurSandovrushotand
killed two men in a gang-related
incident in California. Two
weeks later, he killed aman who
had given the police information about the earlier killings
and that man's wife. The jury in
his case was given the following
instruction on reasonable doubt:
'''Reasonable doubt' ..
.is that state of the case which,
after ... consideration of all the
evidence, leaves the mind ofthe
jurors in that condition that they
cannot say that they feel an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, ofthe truth ofthe charge."
Sandoval was convicted
of four counts of first-degree
murder with special circumstances. He was sentenced to
death for murdering the woman
and was sentenced to life in
prison without the possibility of
parole for the other three murders.
Similarly, on December
26, 1987, Clarence Victor killed
an elderly acquaintance by beating her with a pipe and slashing
her throat. The jury in his case

was given the following instruction on the definition of reasonable doubt:
"'Reasonable doubt' is
such doubt as would cause a
reasonable person ... to pause
and hesitate before taking the
represented facts as true and
relying and acting thereon. You
may be convinced ofthe truth of
a fact beyond a reasonable doubt
and yet be fully aware that possibly you may be mistaken. A
reasonable doubt is an actual
and substantial doubt arising
from the evidence, from the facts
or circumstances ... and [is]
distinguished from a doubt arising from mere possibility, bare
imagination or fanciful conjecture."
Victor was convicted of
first degree murder and was sentenced to death. On appeal,
both Sandoval's and Victor's
convictions were affirmed by
the Supreme Court of California and the Supreme Court of
Nebraska, respectively. The
United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in each case.
Because ofthe similarity offacts
and issues existing between the
two cases, they were consolidated and decided together on
appeal.
The Court began its
analysis by reaffirming the principle that, in criminru trials, due
process requires that the government prove each and every
element of a charged offense
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
at 1242 (citing In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358 (1970)). However, the Court acknowledged
that, although a bedrock prin-
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ciple of the American justice
system, the concept of reasonable doubt "defies easy explication." Id The Court rejected
the notion that the Constitution
requires the use of any particular phraseology when advising a
jury of the government's burden ofproof and concluded that
the instructions need only correctly convey the concept of
"reasonable doubt" to survive
constitutional scrutiny. Id at
1251 (citing Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 140
(1954». The Court firmly rejected any notion that it should
perform a supervisory role over
state courts' reasonable doubt
instructions by indicating that
the proper inquiry when reviewing a challengedjury instruction
is whether there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. Id
The Court then noted
that Sandoval's primary objections to the jury instructions
given in his case concerned the
use of nineteenth century
phrases such as "to a moral
certainty" and "moral evidence." These phrases, he contended, confused the jury by
pointing its attention to the ethics and morality of his criminal
actions rather than toward the
facts and evidence presented in
the case, thereby rendering the
instruction unconstitutional.
The Court acknowledged that
neither "moral certainty" nor
"moral evidence" were mainstays ofmodern vocabulary, and
expressed particular concern
over the use ofthe former. Id at

1247. The Court accepted the
premise that either of these
phrases, standing alone, might
not be synonymous with the
correct standard of "reasonable
doubt," which the jury might
then understand to mean proof
lower than the "very high level
of probability required by the
Constitution in criminal cases."
Id
Nevertheless, the Court
rejected this argument, pointing
out that in Sandoval's case, the
challenged phrases did not stand
alone; but rather, they were defined within the instructions. Id
at 1246-47. The Court reasoned
that the statement that "absolute certainty was unattainable
in matters relating to human
affairs" focused the jurors' attention on the evidence and proof
introduced at trial, and not upon
their own personal notions of
morality and justice, for the determination of guilt or innocence.ld at 1247-48. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the instruction, taken as a whole,
was "unproblematic" and did
not offend due process. Id at
1247.
The Court then turned
its attention to Petitioner
Victor's case, and his contention that his jury instruction
impermissibly equated "reasonable doubt" with "substantial
doubt," thereby overstating the
degree of doubt necessary for
an acquittal by the jury. Id at
1250. The Court agreed that
this equation was "somewhat
problematic" because it could
indeed imply to the j ury that for
acquittal it must have a large

degree of doubt about the truth
ofthe charge, a standard clearly
greater than required under
Winship. Id The Court noted
that for precisely this reason,
several courts, including itself,
had criticized the use of "substantial doubt" to define a reasonable doubt. Id (citing Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478,
488 (1978».
However, despite these
concerns, the Court pointed out
that, as in Sandoval's case, the
instruction in Victor's case provided a frame of reference for
"substantial doubt," giving it
context and informing the jury
ofits intended meaning. Id The
Court opined that the explicit
distinction between "substantial doubt" and "fanciful conjecture" saved the instruction
from unconstitutionality by making it clear to the jury that "substantial" referred to the existence of some doubt, rather than
the magnitude ofdoubt, required
for acquittal. Id
In addition, the Court
reasoned that the instruction did
not offend due process, notwithstanding the use of "substantial doubt," because it also
included an appropriate alternative definition of "reasonable doubt": that degree of
doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to
act. Id The Court reaffirmed
its approval ofthis formulation,
holding that it was a sufficiently
c1earcommon-sense benchmark
of the degree of doubt necessary for acquittal. Id (citing
Holland, 348 U.S. at 140).
Finally, the Court re-

jected Victor's argument that
the instruction's reference to
"strong possibilities" understated the government's burden
of proof. The Court once again
pointed out that the instruction
clearly informed the jury that
the possibilities must be sufficiently strong based upon the
evidence and facts presented to
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; therefore, the instruction was constitutional. Id. at 1251 (citing
Dunbar v. United States, 156
U.S. 185, 199 (1895)).
In a concurring opinion,
Justice Kennedy expressed concern over the use of archaic
terms and phrases in modern
jury instructions, notingthatthey
tend to "confuse far more than
they clarify." Id. He criticized
their continued use as "quite
indefensible" when asking jurors to perform the difficult task
of deciding guilt orinnocence in
a criminal trial. Id. Nevertheless, he agreed with the
majority'sholdingthatthechallenged instructions were not offensive to due process. Id.
Justice Ginsburg, in a

dissenting opinion, took issue
with the conclusion that "reasonable doubt" is practically
undefinable and thattrial courts
should not attempt to define the
concept unless asked to do so
by the jury. Id. at 1252-53. Although she agreed that the instructions in these particular
cases did not offend due process, she voiced her disapproval
of the continued use of terms
attempting to define "reasonable doubt" that were
"unhelpful at best and utterly
confusing at worst," and she
encouraged the Court's endorsement ofthe model reasonable doubt instruction proposed
by the Federal Judicial Center,
which does not contain any antiquated language. Id. at 1253.
In a strongly-worded
dissent, Justice Blackmun,
joined in part by Justice Souter,
argued that the reasonable doubt
standard could only protect innocent defendants to the extent
that it was understood by juries.
In his view, it was "critical that
the moral force of the criminal
law not be diluted by a standard
of proof that leaves people in

doubt whether innocent [persons] are being condemned."
. Id. at 1254 (quoting Winship,
397 U.S. at 364)). He condemned the majority's willingness to overlook the "predominance ofpotentially misleading
language" in Victor's instruction, the whole purpose of
which, in his view, was to
"minimize the jury's sense of
responsibility for the conviction
of those who may be innocent."
Id. at 1257.
In Victor v. NebraSka,
the United States Supreme
Court clearly indicated that it
will not lead the charge to rewrite and clarify state reasonable doubt instructions anytime
in the near future. The Court
foreclosed the use of the Due
Process Clause to force states
to redraft these instructions.
Nevertheless, the push for revision of instructions concerning
this central standard in criminal
trials will no doubt continue and
perhaps even gain momentum,
given the justices' finding that
current instructions are "archaic," "problematic," and
"quite indefensible."
- William L. Mitchell, II

